Two Transitions: Democratisation and the Evolution of the Spanish Socialist Left

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This article examines the factors which contributed to the rapid social democrotisation of the Spanish Socialist Party after its 1976 Congress. Three major factors are stressed: the structural weakness of the Party; the electoral popularity of a moderate strategy; and the pressures inherent in the nature of the transition from Franquist authoritarianism to parliamentary democracy. Finally, a brief assessment is made of the internal party strains caused by this strategy, as well as of the advantages and drawbacks to the Party of its social democrotisation.

In December 1976, after President Suárez’s democratic reform bill had won a stunning victory in the Franquist parliament, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) held its first Party Congress inside Spain since before the Spanish Civil War. At this Congress – its 27th – attended by Europe’s most prominent socialist leaders, the PSOE presented itself as one of the world’s most revolutionary socialist parties. The Party defined itself as ‘mass, Marxist and democratic’, and officially rejected ‘any attempt to accommodate capitalism, or any simple reform of this system’.¹ The PSOE became Europe’s only openly ‘Marxist’ socialist party, and its platforms were far to the left of any other socialist party of Western Europe.

Despite the rhetoric of its 27th Congress, the PSOE, by late 1979, had emerged as one of Europe’s most moderate socialist parties, far closer to the northern European social democratic parties than to the parties of Mitterand or Papandreou.² Indeed, when the PSOE swept to power in the October 1982 general elections, it presented an extremely cautious platform in which the PSOE’s earlier emphasis on nationalisation, foreign policy realignment, autogestion, and other ‘socialist’ reforms was absent. In government, the PSOE has been the epitome of a social democratic party. The Spanish socialists have pursued a harsh economic austerity policy while steering clear of a policy of nationalisation such as that implemented by their French counterparts. Even in the area of foreign policy, where the party had previously remained closer to its 1976 resolutions, the PSOE government has charted a surprisingly moderate course. By early 1984, one prominent observer suggested that the Socialists had become Spain’s new centre party.³

How can this seemingly dramatic shift in the Socialist Party be explained? This question is important in several respects. Firstly, for those who remain sceptical about the democratic credentials of Spain’s largest political party, the rapid metamorphosis of the PSOE suggests an ephemeral electoral
opportunism which could evaporate rapidly under pressure from the Party base. Thus, it becomes important to consider whether the PSOE’s rapid metamorphosis reflects a genuine ideological shift rather than a temporary tactical moderation. Secondly, given the importance of the PSOE’s moderation in the overall success of Spain’s transition from authoritarianism to parliamentary democracy, it is of great theoretical interest to understand why and how the Socialists were able to make the internal changes facilitating their collaboration in, and support for the Suárez reform, their participation in the writing of the Constitution, and ultimately, their electoral victory in October 1982. Finally, in light of the PSOE’s experience in power since 1982, it is important to assess some of the costs and benefits associated with the rapid shift of the Party from a ‘Marxist’ to a social democratic position. For many within the Spanish left, the PSOE is seen as having sacrificed its ideological convictions and mobilising potential in order to contribute to the consolidation of parliamentary democracy. This article contends that the PSOE’s metamorphosis was facilitated by the peculiarity of the Spanish transition from authoritarianism to parliamentary democracy. Specifically, as will become clearer below, Spain experienced a ‘transactive’ transition to democracy, initiated and implemented by leaders of the Franquist regime. This unprecedented form of democratic regime change presented the Spanish socialist left with an awkward political situation, helping to account for the rapidity of the Party’s ideological mutation.

Furthermore, this article argues that the PSOE has returned to a situation of ‘normalcy’ after an aberrant and somewhat artificial period of radicalisation in the last years of Franquism. In addition to constituting a strategic response to transactive democratisation, the moderation of the Party has placed it more in line with its historical tradition, its potential electorate, its organisational strength and structure, and the beliefs and values of its own cadres.

Thus, while the concrete experience of the PSOE’s social democratisation may have differed from that of its European counterparts, the end result has been a similar acceptance of parliamentary democracy, advanced industrial capitalism, and class compromise.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Ever since Pablo Iglesias founded the PSOE in 1879, the Party has been divided between social democratic and Marxist factions, as was the case in virtually every other European country. However, despite the rather rigid view of the class struggle and the imminent decline of capitalism held by its founders, the PSOE quickly became an electoral party. With the legalisation of workers’ associations and the implementation of universal suffrage in the 1880s, Iglesias increasingly steered the Party towards the conquest of concrete reforms within a parliamentary democratic framework, and in 1910 Iglesias became the PSOE’s first elected Deputy in the Cortes. This reformism was strengthened during the economic boom resulting from Spain’s neutrality in World War I. While a revolutionary element was present in the Party during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, the moderates maintained
their hegemony within the Party. When the 'maximalist' sector broke away to form the Communist Party (1920–21), the social democratic orientation of the PSOE was enhanced. The weakness of the Communist Party during the bulk of the pre-Civil War period attests to the overall insignificance of the Marxist wing of the Spanish socialist movement.

It is thus not surprising that many of the leading intellectuals associated with the PSOE (Besteiro and de los Ríos, for example) could in no way be characterised as revolutionary socialists. Socialist intellectuals warmly welcomed the advent of the Second Republic in 1931, and they were among its most dedicated founders. In the first years of the Republic, until about 1933, the PSOE remained firmly committed to the parliamentary democratic route to socialism.

The Republic's failure to implement socio-economic reforms, the domestic hostility provoked by attempted reforms, the international climate of the period, and perhaps most importantly, the irresponsible behaviour of the PSOE leadership, were all partly responsible for the PSOE's experiment with a more revolutionary strategy. The ill-fated 1934 Asturian uprising and the especially brutal response to it by the rightist government, ignited the radical wing of the PSOE, led by Francisco Largo Caballero and fuelled by the rhetorical fervour of Arquistaín. The PSOE's shift to the left is perhaps more understandable given the crushing of its counterparts in Germany and Austria, although it can be argued that PSOE leaders learned precisely the wrong lessons from these experiences. In addition, Diaz has noted an accumulation of factors contributing to this radicalisation, including the PSOE's fierce competition with parties to its left, the pressures from the PSOE base, especially among its agrarian supporters, the economic crisis associated with the Great Depression, and the personal (as much as ideological) rivalry between party leaders.

Irrespective of the causes behind the responsibility for this radicalisation, it is clear that the PSOE did not have the organisational capacity to carry out a socialist revolution, as the Asturian disaster graphically demonstrated. Thus, even if a revolutionary mobilisation could have been justified as a response to the rightist assault during the bienio negro, it is undeniable that the PSOE did not possess the strength to carry it out. The breakdown of parliamentary democracy in Spain and the defeat of the Republican forces in the Civil War were particularly bitter defeats for the PSOE. As the strongest party during the Republic, it was especially traumatised by Franco's victory. On an organisational level, the party was virtually obliterated. By 1948, six consecutive PSOE Executive Committees had been arrested, and their members jailed or executed. In comparison with the Communists, whose party structure was better suited to clandestine existence, the PSOE lacked any real organisational presence within Spain until the late 1960s. On a more ideological and strategic level, the impact of the Republican experience was clearly visible. The Party's leadership, in exile, sustained a strategy based principally on anti-communism. To no avail, the PSOE banked on the allied powers to invade, or later, to strangle the Franquist regime economically and politically. Instead, the Franquist regime obtained a series of political victories on the international front, and after 1953 Spain had
succeeded in using its anti-communist credentials to obtain a restricted but undeniable entry into the league of Western capitalist nations.

By clinging stubbornly to the hope of a foreign defeat of Franquism, the PSOE leadership failed to exploit opportunities for infiltration of the regime. To some extent, such opportunities were missed due to the PSOE’s unwillingness to engage in any form of collaboration with the PCE. But in addition, the PSOE’s leadership in exile had genuinely lost touch with the realities of a regime which it considered to be transitory.

Beginning in the mid-1950s a number of socialist groups were organised within Spain, independently of the PSOE. The most important of these was the Partido Socialista del Interior (PSI) led by Enrique Tierno Galván. These new socialist groups attracted many university students, as well as activists involved in Catholic labour organisations, who were more open to collaboration with other anti-Franquist forces, including the Communists. Within the PSOE itself, a movement of young professionals in the interior began to advocate greater control over Party strategy and organisation. While it exceeds the limits of this article to detail this process, it is important to trace its major features, since the nature of the renovation helps to explain the ideological component which was temporarily associated with it.

The struggle for power within the PSOE during the 1960s and early 1970s involved, on the one hand, the Party leadership in exile, led by Secretary-General Llopis, and, on the other, the delegations from the interior (in addition to the Paris delegation). The most prominent interior leaders were Felipe González, Alfonso Guerra, Luis Gómez Llorente, Pablo Castellano, and much of the current PSOE leadership. The Llopis faction, in addition to being opposed to any collaboration with the PCE, also represented the right wing of the party ideologically. Thus, the struggle against the exiled leadership appeared to be more of a duel between the Party left and right than it actually was. Undoubtedly, the groups from the interior, led by a very young group of activists, tended toward a more dogmatic rhetoric. But this should be assessed within the context of the struggle for power within the PSOE. It is not surprising that this ‘opposition within an opposition’ espoused an apparently maximalist ideology, given the fact that they were simultaneously locked in a bitter struggle for power within the PSOE and a clandestine battle against the Franquist regime.

It was not until the Party’s 11th Congress, held in exile at Toulouse in 1970, that interior activists were able successfully to challenge the PSOE leadership. The interior groups presented a number of proposals aimed at reorienting Party strategy and democratising its organisational structure. This Congress, marked by a fiery denunciation of the lack of internal freedom by the PSOE militant ‘Isidoro’ (Felipe González), also saw the election of an Executive Committee composed of a majority of interior members. González’s proposals, supported by the younger Paris delegation, were approved despite Llopis’ opposition.

By 1972 the interior had wrested control of the PSOE from the old guard, and the Llopis faction had formed the PSOE ‘historical’ sector (PSOE-h). By 1974, when Felipe González was elected Secretary-General at the 12th Congress, the departure of much of the Party’s right wing, the sudden
revitalisation of the Party’s interior organisations, and the concomitant swelling of Party ranks, all had contributed to a leftward shift of the PSOE. Thus, the revitalisation of the PSOE in the interior was associated with a radicalisation of the Party. As mentioned earlier, this was hardly surprising, given the fact that the PSOE organisation in the interior was involved in a clandestine struggle. But this fact helps to explain the radical party platform approved at the PSOE 27th Congress in December of 1976, the first tolerated PSOE Congress inside Spain for over 40 years. The PSOE, at that time, was still illegal, although its activities were increasingly tolerated, and this ambiguous status helped to bolster the radical line within the party.

However, any attempt to understand the predicament of the PSOE in late 1976 must place the 27th Congress in the broader context of the Suárez reform and the transition to parliamentary democracy. For that reason, the next section of this article examines the peculiar nature of Spain’s regime transition, and how the transition presented a special paradox to the democratic opposition.

THE DILEMMA OF ‘TRANSACTIVE’ DEMOCRATISATION

Until the 1950s, Spanish Socialists put their faith in an exogenously induced end to the Franquist regime. In the 1960s, socialist groups operating independently from the PSOE began to organise toward an eventual democratic ruptura, or clean break from authoritarianism. However, the few attempts by the Spanish left to weaken authoritarianism from below were dismal failures. No strike, protest movement, or pressure from below ever seriously crippled the regime’s ability to control the streets. 15 While it is true that the increasing mass-level opposition to the Franquist regime was slowly eroding the legitimacy of Spanish authoritarianism, the organised opposition was most often unable to channel this activity. Even José María Maravall, generally an advocate of the importance of ‘pressure from below’ in the transition to democracy in Spain, has noted that,

The [working class] pressure was always intense, but at a certain moment it was largely divorced from organizational strategies and was not directed by any political or trade unionist goals. In addition, this pressure never surpassed the ability of the transitional government to react because, among other things, mobilization was supported by only a limited sector of the population. 16

Spanish opposition parties remained very weak and fragmented, with the exception of the Communist Party and its affiliated labour organisation, the Comisiones Obreras (CCOO). The PSOE, even after its revitalisation, remained a tiny party with little mass organisation.

Even though the Franquist regime was never threatened by a short-term challenge from below, it nevertheless entered into a protracted internal political crisis after 1973. In December of that year, President Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s closest political collaborator and the man intended as the guardian of the Franquist system after the dictator’s expected death, was
assassinated, throwing regime elites into chaos and triggering off an intense struggle for power that was not resolved before Franco’s death in 1975. With Franco’s illness and impending death after 1973, and with the disappearance of Carrero Blanco, the various ‘families’ of the regime began to jockey for position in an attempt to oversee the transition from Franquism to the Franquist monarchy. The succession crisis upset the delicate balance among authoritarian coalition members, a situation described by Linz in his path-breaking works.17 After his coronation, King Juan Carlos reappointed Carrero’s successor, Carlos Arias Navarro, as Prime Minister. The young monarch lacked the power and prestige at that early stage to attempt to replace Arias with someone of his own liking. After Arias’ dismal failure to implement a limited democratic reform of Franquist institutions in early 1976, Juan Carlos removed Arias and replaced him with Adolfo Suárez, a young Franquist bureaucrat with roots in Spain’s National Movement.

Between July 1976, when he became Prime Minister, and June 1977, when the first democratic elections were held in over 40 years, Suárez initiated and implemented a democratic reform programme through the Franquist legal framework. This programme, which took the form of a constitutional amendment, included the Cortes’ approval of the amendment in November, a popular referendum on the programme in December, the legalisation of most political parties in early 1977, the legalisation of the PCE in April, the dismantling of the National Movement in May, and the calling of general elections in June.18

What is important to understand with this summary of the Spanish transition is, first and foremost, that democratisation was initiated from above. Franco died peacefully in his bed, and his regime did not instantly perish with him as had often been predicted with varying degrees of optimism, gloom and fear. Juan Carlos, hand-picked by Franco, succeeded the dictator as planned. The coercive apparatus, the Franquist legal structures, and even the same president, all remained in place.

Arias’ attempt to revive Franquist institutions at first appeared to confirm the opposition’s worst fears: that change would come slowly, and that this change need not entail the end of the Spanish authoritarianism. Not surprisingly, the democratic opposition renewing its calls for a provisional government and democratic ‘break’ with Franquism, were vociferous opponents of the Arias plan. But Arias’ programme failed for a number of other and equally important reasons, most crucial of which was his inability to convince the so-called ‘bunker’ (the Franquist right).19 The impotence of the democratic opposition seemed to be demonstrated in July 1976, when Juan Carlos shocked the opposition and delighted the regime right by appointing Suárez, a politician with impeccable Franquist credentials. The initial horror on the part of the opposition was widely publicised, and the appointment led much of the opposition to become even more intransigently supportive of a democratic break.20 However, Suárez moved swiftly to implement a strategy of democratic reform. His rapid pace, his willingness to enter into dialogue with opposition representatives, and finally, the far-reaching nature of his proposed reform programme, all diluted the opposition’s criticism. After Suárez’s public announcement of his reform plan, the opposition responded
with guarded optimism, and given the initial hostility, this was a sign that Suárez was quickly gaining their support.\textsuperscript{21}

Spain's Socialists were thus faced with an unprecedented dilemma. An authoritarian regime was itself initiating and controlling a transition to parliamentary democracy. In his attempt to gain support from regime progressives as well as the democratic opposition, Suárez hoped to execute what has elsewhere been called a ‘transition through transaction’.\textsuperscript{22} As Figure 1 illustrates, ‘transactive’ democratisation is distinguished from other types of democratic transition by: (1) its initiation and implementation by (rather than in opposition to) members of the authoritarian regime; and (2) the relatively rapidity and extensiveness (as opposed to a gradual and incremental nature) of the change.

**FIGURE 1**
**PATHS OF DEMOCRATISATION FROM AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES**

*Democratisation By or Against Regime Leadership?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiated by Regime: (Consensual)</th>
<th>Initiated vs. Regime: (Non-Consensual)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Incremental Transition</td>
<td>Transition Through Protracted Revolutionary Struggle</td>
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<td>Gradual:</td>
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<td>[e.g. England]</td>
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<td>Rapid:</td>
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<td>Transition Through Transaction</td>
<td>Transition Through Revolution, Coup or Collapse</td>
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<td>[e.g. Spain, 1975–77]</td>
<td>[e.g. France (1789), Portugal (1974), Italy (1946)]</td>
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For an opposition which had been advocating *ruptura* and which entertained hopes of participation in a provisional government, the idea of accepting a democratic reform imposed from above and without any clear guarantees concerning democratic freedoms was greeted with scepticism. After all, it was frequently argued among the left that there was no historical precedent for an authoritarian regime democratising ‘from within’. To support such a transition would be tantamount to admitting that *ruptura* was not feasible. Furthermore, in 1976 the PSOE was undergoing a process of radicalisation, and this did not facilitate the Party’s acceptance of the Suárez reform. The PSOE leadership was faced with the following dilemma: should the Party continue to oppose any form of transition negotiated with Francoist regime, continuing to advocate a provisional government and a more conventional end to authoritarianism? Or, as Suárez hoped, should the PSOE throw its support behind the Prime Minister’s reform plan, gambling that the plan would lead to a parliamentary democracy? The following sections explore how the PSOE resolved this dilemma, and suggest an explanation for the nature and rapidity of the resolution.

THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE PSOE

As long as there was some possibility of *ruptura*, there was little incentive to abandon the maximalist rhetoric adopted at the 27th PSOE Congress. Any such abandonment would only spell acceptance of the Suárez reform programme, and the PSOE could not yet be convinced of the scope and possibilities for success of the Prime Minister’s ‘transactive’ strategy. However, three factors soon convinced the PSOE leadership to pursue a more moderate and conciliatory strategy. First, in the early months of 1977 the Suárez reform programme remained on course, despite the wave of terrorist violence that shook the country in January and February. Suárez’s own calm, as well as his refusal to be intimidated into slowing down the reform process, reassured the still sceptical opposition. The Prime Minister’s success during this difficult period was, in turn, facilitated by the responsible behaviour of the democratic opposition. Second, and more importantly, was the impact of the imminent electoral campaign. PSOE elites were aware that maximalist rhetoric, as well as the Party’s continued insistence on a *ruptura* would only alienate the electorate. García San Miguel, a sympathetic observer of the democratic opposition during the period, urged the opposition to drop the concept of *ruptura*, and he welcomed the increasing usage of the term *ruptura pactada* (a negotiated break) as a step in the right direction. A third factor was Suárez’s unexpected legalisation of the PCE during Holy Week of 1977. If the PSOE had previously been the only legal party on the left, the Socialists were suddenly faced with a serious challenge from Spain’s best organised political party. Moreover, the PCE, in exchange for its legalisation, had publicly accepted the Monarchy and developed an extremely moderate party platform. Suárez’s decision to legalise the Communists was partly motivated by his desire to split the leftist vote, and the electoral space of the PSOE and PCE were known to overlap to a considerable extent. Opinion research showed quite conclusively that the bulk of the Spanish
electorate was located in the centre-left of the political spectrum, creating an additional incentive for a move toward the centre.\(^3\)

The PSOE’s moderation did not occur overnight. Its electoral campaign strategy mirrored quite accurately its internal division over the direction in which the PSOE should move. On the whole, the Party presented a moderate image to the electorate, playing down the ‘socialist’ aspects of its programme and emphasising instead the personal appeal of Felipe González. However, at mass rallies, and in specially targeted electoral advertisements, the PSOE appeared as a more traditional working-class party.\(^3\) Its overall campaign slogan was ‘Socialism is Freedom’, and its general advertising campaign presented an image of a party favouring and representing a very pluralistic society. The PSOE Electoral Manifesto stated that the PSOE was ‘a party of workers, professionals, functionaries, and small farm and factory owners’. In addition, it asserted that the Party was the ‘key to Europe’ and that it sought to ‘create a more egalitarian society via the necessary reforms’. However, Party documents geared toward workers typically emphasised that ‘the Party for almost one hundred years has defended the interests of the working class. The PSOE, the major working class party of the country, seeks to defend the workers, offering genuine solutions that seek to exchange the injustice and exploitation of society for one where human beings occupy their rightful place.’\(^3\)

The PSOE’s performance in the 1977 elections was heartening, given the brevity of the electoral campaign, the tremendous governmental resources at the disposal of Suárez’s campaign, the organisational weakness of the Party, and the presence of a competing socialist coalition. With 28.5 per cent of the votes and 33.7 per cent of the seats in the Lower House, the PSOE clearly emerged as the leading opposition party.

In explaining the PSOE’s success in the first post-Franquist elections, several scholars have noted the surprising persistence of party loyalty despite 40 years of authoritarianism, suggesting that the PSOE was able to benefit from its historical image and name.\(^3\) This gave the PSOE a noteworthy advantage over the two major parties of the right, as well as the unsuccessful centrist and social democratic parties which did not survive the first elections.

As the PSOE faced the prospect of entering the first democratically elected Parliament in over 40 years, and as it contemplated its future role in the writing of a new Constitution, the internal debate concerning the appropriate political course for the Party intensified. The revitalisation of the PSOE, the rapid transition to parliamentary democracy, and the encouraging performance of the Socialists in the first elections, combined to exacerbate a profound ideological tension within the Socialist Party. While this debate has often been passed off as a simple question of tactics and strategy, a closer look reveals that a genuine political rift existed within the PSOE. For most of the PSOE leadership, and a majority of PSOE members, the 1977 elections were welcomed as an end to 40 years of authoritarianism. In the words of one left-wing observer, ‘the sueño dorado of the Spanish left would be to go into elections and to lose them respectfully’.\(^3\) The results seemed to make the PSOE indispensable in any attempt to write a Constitu-
tion. Felipe González and his top advisers saw the Party’s first priority to be the consolidation of parliamentary democracy, and the writing of a new Constitution. Both Suárez and the PSOE leadership realised that the fulfilment of these objectives would require a negotiated solution to some of Spain’s most potentially disruptive issues. Thus, in October 1977, PSOE leaders met with those of the other political parties in the Moncloa Palace and signed a broad political-economic pact, known as the ‘Moncloa Pacts’. On the constitutional front, after an initial period of left-right conflict, the PSOE and UCD negotiated some of the most thorny issues in the famous consenso.36

The PSOE’s participation in the Moncloa Pacts as well as in the constitutional consenso brought the Party leadership under fire from some of its membership. Critics not only noted that these elite level inter-party agreements were prejudicial to the working class, but also, on a more general level, claimed that the PSOE was emphasising its electoral side at the expense of its mass base. These and other criticisms eventually crystallised in the PSOE faction known as the sector crítico (the critical sector).37 Ironically, some of the most prominent political leaders of the critical sector were once considered to be to the right of Felipe González. Pablo Castellano, for example, acknowledged as a key spokesperson for the críticos, had opposed the young ‘Marxist’ González during Franquism on a number of strategy issues.38 In addition to assailing the PSOE’s ideological moderation during the transition, the críticos attacked the electoral emphasis of the Party. Gómez Llorrente warned that the PSOE’s focus on elections and votes ‘might result in swollen electoral figures, but we will have tainted the instrument of the working class, and later these votes will not be of any use in carrying out the programme that until this moment had been proposed as the objective of the PSOE’.39 In addition, the critical sector attacked the increasing felipismo, or cult of Felipe González, which it saw as motivated by electoral concerns.40 On a more general level, the críticos viewed the moderation of the PSOE as the result of rightist intimidation. The social democratisation of the PSOE, he contended, was the price that the Spanish left paid for democratisation.41

Castellano’s assertion receives some support from the recent theoretical literature on democratic transition. In ‘transactive’ democratisation the authoritarian regime remains intact to oversee the process of regime change. Leaders from the authoritarian regime initiate and implement democratisation and, by so doing, set limits to the transition. Di Palma notes that opposition to authoritarian regimes, when including major socio-economic changes as part of their opposition platform, are likely to antagonise supporters of authoritarian regimes, and thus endanger the ‘transactive’ project:

Since we are talking of capitalist democracies, there must be collective consent to the reproduction of capital. Though the matter seems obvious, this requires less obviously avoiding policies of democratic reconstruction designed to significantly hamper capital’s capacity to accumulate and invest or, worse, to punish capitalists collectively for their real or alleged class role in the first demise of democracy or in the running of the dictatorship.42
Przeworski concurs that 'transactive' democratisation necessarily entails a class compromise, but goes a step further to suggest that: 'It seems as if almost complete docility and patience on the part of the organized workers is needed for democratic transition to succeed. Any degree of economic militancy seems to jeopardize the chance of establishing a stable democratic regime.'

The critical sector always represented a very small minority within the PSOE. After the PSOE 27th Congress, those advocating a more moderate Party strategy steadily gained influence among the PSOE leadership, especially González and Guerra. Supported by a number of prominent PSOE intellectuals, Felipe González rapidly moved the PSOE towards a position that could only be described as social democratic. The Party leadership, operating within a new electoral and parliamentary environment, began to distance the PSOE from the 27th Congress's 'Bad Godesberg in reverse'.

After the 1977 elections, the PSOE leadership pursued a more moderate course than that prescribed in the Party platforms for a number of reasons. First, the electoral results were highly encouraging. The expected unification with the PSP, the likely erosion of the UCD once in government (given its heterogeneous composition), and the electorate's decreasing fear of the military and the right, were all seen to favour a PSOE electoral victory in the near future. This meant that the Socialists were interested in continuing to help consolidate the parliamentary democratic regime since, contrary to the predictions of some, this was not shaping up to be a regime exclusively for the right. Second, the PSOE was deeply immersed in the drafting of the Spanish Constitution, a document far more progressive than might have originally been predicted. The PSOE scored a number of concrete victories in the Constitutional negotiations, especially concerning the right of the state to intervene in the economy. These victories were achieved through a complex series of compromises in which the PSOE accepted the constitutionalisation of a capitalist free-market economy and an expressed recognition of the special role of the Catholic Church in Spanish society. Third, there was increasing concern about the prospects for democracy in Spain. The persistent problem of terrorism, the incessant complaints from disgruntled sectors of the military, and the disastrous state of an economy neglected during a period of political crisis, appeared to demand an inter-party consensus at the elite level. In a sense, the PSOE leadership, haunted by past nightmares, felt increasingly responsible for the consolidation of a regime they had not initiated. For most of the PSOE leadership, the prospect of a return to authoritarianism was the most serious danger against which Party strategy need be directed. Javier Solana, a PSOE Executive Committee member, stated this position quite clearly:

Democracy and its consolidation come first, before our political programmes. These might take twenty or thirty years to put into practice. Why this order of priorities? Because the Spanish right has shown that it can live very well under both authoritarian and democratic regimes, while the left can only survive within a democratic framework. We have a lot of pain and suffering, and many years behind bars, to prove that.
In establishing these priorities, the experiences in other countries, as well as the PSOE’s own history, played an important role. As Solana stated,

The events in Chile were a clear message to all of us on the eve of the transition, and we got a good dose of reality from that tragedy. Portugal was also important, since there was virtual revolution in progress there when Franco died. The lesson we extracted from both cases was very much shared among our leadership, and the political class in general: political advances are of little use if they do not accompany a consolidation of a democratic regime. Mistakes made in the first two years can lead to a situation that takes forty years to reverse.\textsuperscript{51}

As early as the summer of 1976, González was expressing the view that the PSOE could not be an exclusively working-class party. According to the PSOE Secretary-General, there was no longer one, homogeneous working class in the nineteenth-century sense. Instead, he noted that the PSOE represented ‘all repressed people, whether manual or intellectual workers’.\textsuperscript{52} In making this shift, the PSOE depended on a number of findings presented by social scientists close to the Party. Tezanos, for example, cautioned against an excessive obrerismo and noted that the strength of the Party, as well as the area of likely penetration in the future, was centred in the clases medias. Tezanos warned that,

An incorrect definition of the class nature of the PSOE that fails to take into account the new social realities, or which looks down at or ignores the importance of these new social sectors, could not only lead to a dangerous isolation, preventing the achievement of an electoral majority, but could also cause serious political setbacks.\textsuperscript{53}

On the whole, it appears that the moderation of the PSOE leadership was the most rational (although not the only conceivable) response to the ‘transactive’ nature of the Spanish transition. As Mujal-León points out, there was no revolutionary break or popular mobilization as in Portugal which might have provided an arena of influence for the PSOE left.\textsuperscript{54} The radical resolutions of the Party’s 27th Congress were approved during a period when the success of transition through transaction was still much in doubt.\textsuperscript{55} However, before the PSOE could distance itself from the radical legacy of its 27th Congress, the Party leadership had to defeat the críticos in a dramatic showdown. The following section discusses this confrontation in more detail and explains why the PSOE leadership, and with it the moderate Party line, emerged victorious.

THE CHALLENGE AND DEFEAT OF THE PSOE LEFT

If the moderate course charted by the PSOE leadership between June 1977 and December 1978 had entailed some important costs, it nevertheless facilitated the writing and approval of what its leaders considered to be a very progressive Spanish Constitution.\textsuperscript{56} In addition, the PSOE, strengthened by the integration of Tierno Galván’s PSP, entertained hopes of a major victory in the following elections.\textsuperscript{57} However, Prime Minister Suárez
again outmanoeuvred the opposition by calling general elections for March 1979, before the scheduled municipal elections, a move that caught the PSOE offguard.\footnote{58} Although the PSOE attempted to present a moderate image to the electorate, through such slogans as ‘Un Gobierno Firme’ (A Strong Government), through an emphasis on the Party’s maturity, competence and moderation, and by making Felipe González appear older, the discrepancies between the PSOE’s Party Programme and electoral platform constituted a serious problem.\footnote{59}

Unlike the 1977 electoral campaign, the PSOE’s radical Party Programme became the centre of a vicious UCD attack while the Socialists’ moderation in practice became the target of an equally hostile PCE campaign.\footnote{60} In addition, PSOE members issued often contradictory statements regarding the nature of the PSOE programme. Suárez’s televised election eve address picked at the Party’s contradictions, accusing the PSOE of duplicity, and making specific references to the resolutions of the 27th Congress. Likewise, the Church’s more active presence in the 1979 campaign added to fears surrounding a Socialist victory.\footnote{61}

Although the PSOE increased its number of seats more than any other major party, the 1979 elections failed to produce anything near a Socialist majority, and the UCD remained Spain’s leading party in terms of seats and percentage of the vote.\footnote{62} The Socialists were hurt by a very high abstention rate in areas of PSOE strength, widely interpreted as a voto de castigo for the Party’s moderate economic policies.\footnote{63} In addition, the success of regionalist parties, especially in the Basque country and Andalusia, limited the PSOE’s performance. Despite the evidence that working-class abstention and regionalist disaffection were partly to blame for the PSOE’s frustration in the 1979 election, a number of intellectuals close to the PSE interpreted the results as a sign that the Party needed to reach out further towards the centre and attract votes away from the UCD. A number of analyses suggested that the UCD was quite vulnerable on its left, but that it would take a reorientation of the PSE to attract this sector of the electorate.\footnote{64} The Party leadership accepted the implications of such analyses, and in the spring of 1979 González stated in a well-publicised interview that,

There can be no democratic social transformation without a majority. And in order to obtain a majority it is essential to represent a much wider spectrum than originally planned. An example will suffice to illustrate what I am saying: There are twenty-six million voters in this country, out of thirty-six million citizens. Of these voters, thirteen, or fifty per cent, are not in the active population, but this half can decide the future of our country with their votes.\footnote{65}

It was within this context that the PSE’s much awaited 28th Congress was held, in May 1979.\footnote{66} The Congress produced a showdown on three issues that had long divided the leadership from the sector crítico. The first, and most important, concerned ideology. Ever since May 1978, when Felipe González announced that he would seek to remove the term ‘Marxist’ from the Party’s constitution, the Marxism/non-Marxism polemic had gained steam. The second, the organisational issue, concerned the sector crítico’s demand
for a system of proportional representation for selecting representatives for Party Congresses and all other governing bodies of the PSOE. The third bone of contention involved alliance strategy, with the críticos favouring a leftist front with the PCE, especially after the PSOE–PCE municipal pacts had allowed the left to form local governments throughout Spain.67

The results of the Congress were unexpected. While the PSOE executive was successful in defeating the críticos on the organisational and alliance issues, it was dealt a sound defeat on the Marxist/non-Marxist question. González's attempt to define the PSOE as a 'social bloc' lost to an openly Marxist definition. In addition, the Executive's favoured candidate for President, the moderate Catholic Gregorio Peces-Barba, was defeated, a vote interpreted as an attack by delegates against the PSOE's moderate policies and electoral setbacks. Felipe González's dramatic refusal to run for re-election was a clear attempt to force the membership to either side with the críticos or silence them. When questioned about the risks entailed by his resignation, González stated that 'The country cannot wait ten years for the Party to mature. The Party cannot afford the luxury of immaturity...'. The PSOE leader explained:

The Party has to represent the desire for social change of many social sectors which are not identified with one class, contrary to the analysis at the start of the centry. Secondly, the Party has an obligation, in this historic moment, to be a source of tranquillity for society, transcending the boundaries of the Party itself. And it has this obligation because this role can be played only by the Socialist Party. And that is contradictory for a party based on change. This is the whole drama of the PSOE.69

González's strategy was successful for a number of reasons. First, the críticos were not prepared for a full-scale assault and did not aim to gain control of the PSOE apparatus.70 Instead, they sought to gain some representation on the Party Executive Committee and to stem the PSOE's distancing itself from its earlier resolutions. To begin with, the críticos could not produce a leader with the popularity and charisma of González. Second, the rule changes enacted at the 28th Congress put the críticos at a serious disadvantage. A majoritarian electoral system for delegates to congresses, and a bloc-voting provision during congresses, meant that the executive would be able to filter out dissenters in the future.71

The Extraordinary Congress convened in September 1979, if not a measure of unqualified support for the moderate line, was clearly an endorsement of Felipe González as a leader. Most PSOE members agreed that González's leadership was invaluable, and the delegates present at the Congress voted overwhelmingly for the moderate leadership slate.72 While the Party platform acknowledged Marxism as 'a critical, non-dogmatic, theoretical tool . . .', it also vowed to 'include a variety of contributors, marxist and non-marxist, who have helped to make socialism the great liberating alternative of our time . . .' Since the Extraordinary Congress, the sector crítico, with some exceptions, has become less of a force within the PSOE, no longer actively
pursuing power within the Party (at least at the national level). In November 1981, the formation of a study group of the critical PSOE left, under the name Izquierda Socialista was begrudgingly tolerated by the Party Executive. Its members boycotted the 1982 29th Congress of Madrid in protest over the exclusionary tactics of the ‘felipista’ sector. However, Izquierda Socialista has repeatedly vowed to remain within the Party, and its presence has posed no threat to Party unity, as was the case with critical factions in both the PCE and UCD. The continued moderation of the PSOE after its Extraordinary Congress, culminating in the 29th Congress, was much reinforced by the turn of political events since then. First and foremost was the attempted coup d’etat of February 1981. The result of the foiled military coup was to solidify support for the PSOE leadership’s insistence on the need for moderation, given the fragility of the transition process. Members of the PSOE Executive Committee wasted no time in capitalising on this near-disaster to disarm the last redoubts of internal dissent. 

A second and related development was the long and agonising self-destruction of the UCD after the 1979 elections. As the UCD under Calvo Sotelo proved unable to satisfy the Party’s right or left, the PSOE strategy of winning votes from the UCD left began to appear more promising. The departure of a number of respected UCD social democrats, and eventually, the populist progressives of Suárez, all augured well for the PSOE.

However, the disintegration of the UCD, the party responsible for overseeing the transition to democracy, presented new dangers. It was essential that the military should not interpret the demise of the UCD and the concomitant party realignment as a power vacuum. This lent additional support to the PSOE moderates’ desire to project an image of a responsible opposition party capable of becoming the UCD’s replacement.

CONCLUSION

Felipe González insisted that the PSOE 29th Congress, scheduled for October 1981, would not be the Party’s Bad Godesberg. However, the unanimity with which delegates approved the leadership’s moderate platform proved otherwise. After the turbulent 28th Congress, the 99.6 per cent approval of the PSOE leadership (against only 0.4 per cent abstentions), evoked widespread scepticism and even humour. One observer remarked wryly, ‘Everything is working so well that it seems like a West German Congress.’ The uncontested hegemony of the moderates within the Party could also be witnessed in the statements of PSOE leaders during the autumn of 1981. Carmen García Bloise, Executive Committee member, stated that the difference between the Party in 1981 and only two years earlier was that, ‘We are not going to promise anything we cannot deliver. We will keep our socialist goals in mind, but meanwhile, we will adjust our programme to reality.’ Felipe González told the Spanish press that, ‘The PSOE has to carry out a bourgeois revolution, as a first step toward a socialist programme, since the bourgeoisie in this country has yet to create one.’

Although much of the press and members of the Izquierda Socialista denounced the changes in party procedure that resulted in the most
homogeneous PSOE Executive Committee to date, the widely disseminated image of Party unity, the unquestionable personal victory for Felipe González, and the Congress’s emphasis on the concrete problems of Spanish society, all prepared the Socialists for their electoral victory in October 1982.

To return to the questions posed at the outset: how can the Socialists’ dramatic shift, outlined in this article, be explained? Did the transition reflect a reorientation of PSOE ideology and strategy more in line with the actual ideological proclivities of its membership? Was the metamorphosis of Spain’s second largest party a tactical move aimed solely, and perhaps only temporarily, at winning power? Was an otherwise radical party compelled to moderate its platform in order to safeguard the democratic transition and prevent a return to authoritarianism?

The transition of the PSOE was motivated by a mixture of all of the factors discussed above. In terms of a genuine ideological orientation, there can be no doubt that the resolutions of the 27th Congress did not accurately reflect the priorities held by most PSOE members. Further, the PSOE was ill-equipped to pursue a more confrontational strategy. Compared with other European socialist or social democratic parties, the PSOE remains a very small, extremely elitist political party. The PSOE has the smallest percentage of members as a percentage of its voters of any European socialist or social democratic party (1.8 per cent). Its current membership, about 100,000 affiliates, is considerably inferior to leftist parties of even the much smaller West European countries. Finally, an examination of the social composition of PSOE members and Party elites reveals a highly educated, upwardly mobile, professionally orientated group of individuals. At the elite level, those with a working-class background are virtually absent. Even at party congresses, manual workers are in a tiny minority, and professionals and technocrats predominate.

Secondly, there can be little doubt that after 1977 the PSOE leaders increasingly pursued a strategy aimed fundamentally at obtaining a parliamentary majority. Unlike the PCE, whose party structure enables it to survive long periods out of power and whose position on the political spectrum will likely exclude it from government in the near future, the PSOE is a party whose strategy must continue to revolve around elections and government. The Party’s decline in membership after two failures to win elections was a source of frustration for party elites. The right’s ability to capitalise on the PSOE’s ideological ambiguities during the 1979 campaign set the stage for the confrontation between the Socialist left and the moderates of the Executive Committee. The PSOE sweep in the 1982 elections temporarily confirmed the electoral advantages of the Party’s ideological moderation, but it remains to be seen whether the experience of the Socialists in government will challenge the appropriateness of the strategy.

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the context of the Spanish transition played an important role in motivating the PSOE leadership to ignore the resolutions of the 27th Congress and to collaborate with the Suárez government. The ‘transactive’ nature of the Spanish transition, unprecedented at the time, caught the Spanish left off guard. Once Suárez had belied the almost unanimous predictions of failure, and once his strategy
stood a reasonable chance of leading to truly democratic elections, the PSOE was faced with a difficult choice: to participate in the Suárez reform programme, contributing to the success of democratisation, or to boycott the process and risk political exclusion from the new democracy, banking on Suárez’s failure and a future provisional government. To have chosen the latter course, however, would have required a much stronger PSOE, one capable of controlling the streets, and this condition was clearly not met during the years of the transition.

The choice to collaborate in ‘transactive’ democratisation placed Party leaders in a delicate position within the Party. Not only did they face the difficult prospect of contradicting the Party’s (and their own) recent declarations; in addition, their support for, and eventual participation in, ‘transactive’ democracy meant that PSOE leaders would have to dedicate more energy to elite negotiations with the forces they had previously denounced as unacceptable stewards of democratic change. Unlike incremental democratic transitions (in which party leaders have more time to adapt to changing political circumstances) or transitions via revolution, coup or collapse (in which opposition party leaders are likely to play a direct role in democratic inauguration), ‘transactive’ transition requires the opposition to react rapidly and without guarantees. This partially explains why the role of party leaders, and political elites in general, takes on added significance in transition through transaction.

And while in the Spanish case, as Romero-Maura argues, the emerging pattern of elite politics performed a ‘mutual legitimisation’ function, it is equally true that strains between top PSOE leaders and other Party members were exacerbated by the new political style. After the tumultuous 28th Congress, Felipe González appeared to be aware of this problem when he reflected that, ‘There was a complete rejection of everything the Party leadership proposed, perhaps as a protest against what was considered an excessive political role played by a very small group of people.’

The PSOE’s initial response to the success of transition through transaction was to adopt an ambiguous posture vis-à-vis the Suárez reform programme (witness its support for abstention during the referendum on the Law For Political Reform in December 1976). But in early 1977, and from that point on, the PSOE worked closely with Suárez and his government. As mutual trust was established between government and opposition, the PSOE’s commitment to the ‘transacted democracy’ became more wholehearted.

The above considerations shed some light on the final question posed at the outset, that of the costs and benefits of the PSOE’s moderation. The criticisms emanating from Izquierda Socialista are unquestionably valid in that they point to a whole set of costs associated with the metamorphosis of the PSOE. However, these observations too often overlook the fact that Spain experienced a ‘transactive’ transition, initiated and implemented by members of the Franquist regime. They overestimate the strength and organisational potential of the Spanish socialist left, and underestimate the dangers of a return to authoritarianism. Thus, while legitimate questions may be raised with respect to the long term advantages and disadvantages of
this form of regime transition (and especially its appropriateness for other countries), it seems much less valid to question the assertion that the PSOE’s moderation has facilitated the success of ‘transactive’ democratisation.

The PSOE’s social democratisation has contributed to the consolidation of a progressive parliamentary democracy. The Party has sacrificed some of its ideological unity, and has limited the scope of, and potential for, a future socialist transformation (both by accepting the limits of the Spanish Constitution, and by cultivating an elitist political organisation which would be unable to lead a more revolutionary change). Some within the Party will continue to question the wisdom of these trade-offs. However, as the Spanish Socialists approach the end of their first term of government there is evidence that, given the history and composition of the PSOE, the Party has sacrificed much less than it has gained.

NOTES

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1. For all the references to the radicalised 1976 congress, see XXVI Congreso Del Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Barcelona: Avance, 1977).
2. A suggestive, although hardly scientific left–right ranking of European socialist and social democratic parties on a number of important issues (nationalisation, increased public spending, nuclear disarmament, anti-Americanism, anti-EEC sentiment) consistently placed the PSOE on the right end of the spectrum. The Spanish Socialists were evaluated to be far more conservative than their counterparts in Britain, Greece, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and West Germany. See ‘Who’s the Leftist of Them All?’ in The Economist (11 June 1983), p.71.
4. For a good history of the PSOE, see Antonio Padilla, El movimiento socialista español (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977). An excellent account of the Party’s pre-Republican history can be found in L. Gómez Llorente, Aproximación a la historia del socialismo español, hasta 1921 (Madrid: Cuadernos Para el Diálogo, 1972). For an excellent bibliography of the PSOE’s history, see Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Cien años de socialismo en España: bibliografía (Madrid: Editorial Pablo Iglesias, 1979).
7. Two balanced treatments of the PSOE during the Spanish Second Republic are Manuel Contreras, El PSOE en la II República: organización e ideología (Madrid: Centro De Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1981), and ‘El Partido Socialista: la trayectoria de un conflicto interno’, in Manuel Ramírez Jiménez (ed.), Estudios sobre la II República española


11. For a treatment of the PSOE during the Franquist period, see Miguel Peydro Caro, Las escisiones del PSOE (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés, 1980).

12. In 1974, the PSI became the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP). The PSP ran separately in the 1977 elections, winning 4.2 per cent of the vote, and six seats in the lower house. By the 1979 general elections the PSP had merged with the PSOE, and Tierno Galvan was given a largely ceremonial position within the party. He has since twice been elected mayor of Madrid.


14. Thus, when the Llopis faction broke away in 1974, forming the PSOE ‘histórico’, it became an openly social democratic party, which ran in the 1977 elections as part of a social democratic slate.


17. Among the most important of Linz’s works are ‘An Authoritarian Regime: Spain’, in Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littunen (eds.) Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems (Helsinki: Academic Bookstore, 1974), and ‘Opposition In . . .’.

18. For an introductory to the history of the Spanish transition, see Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi, España. . .


20. For some evidence of the negative reactions, see Cambio 16 (12–18 July 1976) and Osorio, p.136. This negative reaction was shared by observers from the centre and right. See Ricardo de La Cierva’s famous ‘¡Que Error! ¡Que Inmenso Error!’, in El País (8 July 1976).

21. For evidence of the reactions by opposition leaders to the Programmatic Statement of the Suárez government, see Informaciones (27 July 1976), and Osorio, op. cit., p.155.


24. Despite the opposition’s adherence to rupturista rhetoric, on 26 February 1976, a revealing joint communiqué issued by the PSOE-dominated Coordinación Democrática and the
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PCE-dominated Junta Democrática asserted that ‘Dictatorships are exited from via military coups, defeats of war, or a general uprising. None of these circumstances is likely to occur in Spain, and the solution must be a long range generational compromise.’ See Eduardo Chamorro, Felipe González: Un hombre a la espera (Barcelona: Planeta, 1980), p.116.


29. On the legalisation of the Spanish Communist Party see Joaquín Bardavío, Sábado santo. ... A useful overview of the period, from a leftist perspective is ‘Análisis de coyuntura ...’, p.15.

30. On the political competition between the PSOE and the PCE, see José María Maravall, ‘Eurocommunism and socialismo en España’, in Sistema No.28 (Jan. 1979), pp.51–73.


34. Maravall notes, for example, a rather astounding correlation between PSOE voters in 1931 and 1977 (p.70). See his ‘La alternativa socialista ...’, p.28.

35. See the analysis in ‘Análisis de coyuntura’, p.14. A very typical view was expressed by Manuel Chavez, a PSOE Deputy in Cortes and a top UGT official, who stated that ‘In my own view, had the PSOE won the 1977 elections it would have been almost impossible for it to take power’ (Interview, 30 Sept. 1981).

36. For an excellent discussion of the PSOE during the writing of the Constitution, as well as the consenso, see Bonifacio de la Cuadra and Soledad Gallego-Díaz, Del consenso al desencanto (Madrid: Saltes, 1981).

37. Examples of works representing the Critical Sector, after November 1980 formally known as ‘Izquierda Socialista’, or ‘socialist left’, are Francisco Bustelo, Introducción al socialismo marxista (Madrid: Dédalo, 1979) and Pablo Castellano, Sobre el partido obrero (Barcelona: El Viejo Topo, 1979).

38. See Diego Armario, El triángulo: el PSOE durante la transición (Valencia: Fernando Torres, 1981), p.38. Armario notes, in addition, that Castellano and Enrique Mugica had originally opposed the Felipe González’s candidacy for secretary general, considering him to be too radical (see p.40).


44. See Jorge de Esteban and Luis López Guerra, Los partidos políticos en la España actual (Barcelona: Planeta, 1982), pp.119–27 for a discussion of the strength of the critical left within the PSOE.

45. The foremost theoretical work behind the PSOE move toward social democracy is Ignacio Sotelo’s El socialismo democrático (Madrid: Taurus, 1980). Chapter VIII is a particularly cogent critique of PSOE policy from 1977–79. In addition, a number of works by PSOE members were aimed at advocating a more moderate programme. Among these are Elias Diaz, ‘Marxismo y no marxismo . . .’, pp.211–32; José Félix Tezanos, ‘El Espacio . . .’, pp.51–79; José María Maravall, Del milenio a la práctica política: el socialismo como reformismo radical’, in Zona Abierta, No.20 (May–Aug. 1979), pp.89–97.


48. On the Spanish Constitution, see Antonio Hernández Gil, El cambio político español y la Constitución (Barcelona: Planeta, 1982) and Jorge de Esteban and Luis López Guerra, El régimen constitucional español (Madrid: Labor, 1980).

49. See, for example, José María Maravall, ‘Las Exigencias de la Democracia’, in Leviatán, No.3 (spring 1981), pp.11–25.

50. Interview with Javier Solana (Jan. 1982).

51. Ibid.


56. On the PSOE leadership’s positive evaluation of the Spanish Constitution, and its confidence vis-à-vis the future, see Perspectivas de una España democrática y constitucionalizada (Madrid: Secretaría De Organización, PSOE, 1978).

57. Alfonso Guerra had predicted that the PSOE would win 200 seats in the next elections.


62. However, UCD won only four per cent more votes than the PSOE. An excellent analysis of the 1979 electoral results is José Félix Tezanos, ‘Análisis sociopolítica del voto socialista en
las elecciones de 1979' in Sistema, No.31 (July 1979), pp.105–21.
64. Two examples are Maravall, ‘La Alternativa . . .’ and José Félix Tezanos, ‘El espacio . . .’.
67. A good overview of these contentious issues is Jorge de Esteban and Luis López Guerra, Los Partidos . . ., p.121.
69. Ibid., p.8.
71. De Esteban and López Guerra, Los Partidos . . ., p.124. It seems clear that the changes in regulations had a profound impact on the sociological composition of the Extraordinary Congress, when compared to the 28th Congress. For evidence, see José Félix Tezanos, ‘Radiografía de dos congresos: una aportación al estudio sociológico de los cuadros políticos del socialismo español’, in Sistema, No. 35 (March 1980), pp.79–99. For a highly critical treatment of the behaviour of the Party Executive during the summer of 1979, see Fernando Barciela, La otra historia del PSOE (Madrid: Emiliano Escolar, 1981), Chap.6, pp.133–51.
72. The moderate slate received 85.9 per cent of the votes, compared with only 6.9 per cent for the críticos and 7.2 per cent abstentions. For a summary of the results of the Extraordinary Congress, see Fernando Ollero Butler, ‘El Congreso Extraordinario del PSOE’, in Revista Del Departamento de Derecho Político, No.6 (Spring 1980), pp.205–15.
73. See, for example, Alfonso Guerra, ‘Situación política tras el golpe de estado’, in Sistema No.42 (May 1981), pp.3–15, and José María Maravall, ‘Las exigencias . . .’, pp.11–25.
74. The resolutions of the 29th Congress are contained in a six-volume set of Memorias (Madrid: PSOE, 1981).
78. For some additional support for this assertion, see the results of a survey of party members, conducted by the PSOE. The results show that a vast majority of PSOE members were either very satisfied or satisfied with the results of the Extraordinary Congress, at which the moderate line of Felipe González, prevailed. The survey results appear in Federico Castano, ‘Un partido para el cambio’, in El Socialista, No.228 (12–17 Oct. 1981), pp.17–22. Also, see José Manuel Arija, ‘Cómo son los Socialistas’, in Cambio 16, No.498 (15 June 1981), pp.29–31.
79. Arija, ‘Cómo son los Socialistas . . .’.
80. De Esteban and López Guerra, Los partidos . . ., p.128, estimate the PSOE’s membership figures as follows: 1933 – 80,000; 1974 – 4,000; 1976 – 8,000; 1977 – 50,000; 1979 – 100,000; 1982 – 99,000.